Abstract-A method for the fault detection in complex industrial systems is presented. The plant devices, the sensors, the actuators, and diagnostic tests are described as discrete-event systems. A formal composition rule of these models is given and an inference procedure for the identification and isolation of the faults is discussed. Temporal information is also considered to speed up the fault isolation procedure and, in some cases, to uniquely identify faults with the same static fault signature.
Thus, in the case in question, the cooperative party will certainly be damaged. The hostile (second) party may benefit from the cooperation of the first party if and only if e 21 < e 210 Nevertheless, from (2) it is seen that the infimum value for e 21 with K1(0) and P22(0) fixed is achieved when K2(0) approaches 0, which would mean indifference of party 2 toward party 1 (i.e., neither hostility nor friendliness).
VII. COMMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS
In the preceding sections, the attractiveness of long-term cooperation was discussed from a systems theoretic point of view. A linear interaction model was used. Using the concept of need for achievement (NA) a behavioral interpretation of the setup and the results was given. Provided there is sufficient combined NA, long-term cooperation will always be attractive. A higher NA in the other can compensate a smaller NA in one party and its government. In the case of insufficient combined NA, cooperation will not be of mutual benefit. However, long-term mutual hostility will not be of benefit either. It was shown that mutual hostility is always detrimental.
The setup used in this paper implies that received cooperation is free of charge or cost. Mutual agreement demanded by practical successful cooperation can be interpreted as a combined choice of policies P 11 (s); P 22 (s); K 1 (s), and K 2 (s), i.e., they will not be chosen independently.
The results derived here are not applicable when the parties' behaviors are not sufficiently well described by linear models or when the output of the parties involved is constrained in some way. In particular for these reasons the adopted approach cannot be used in the well known Prisoner's Dilemma nor in cases when one party defines a structural change in the other party as a goal. In the case of Prisoner's Dilemma-like interaction the results of [5] apply.
I. INTRODUCTION
The ever increasing safety and efficiency requirements in the monitoring, control and management of complex plants motivate the great interest and efforts devoted to the development of fault detection and isolation techniques. Many popular approaches are now available for fault identification. Among them, signal based methods are widely used and attempt to extract useful information from the analysis of specific signals; see [1] for a complete and rigorous analysis of the main statistical methods used for the detection of changes in signals. Model-based methods, such as parity space or observer-based approaches [14] , [5] , use a mathematical model of the plant to explore the analytical redundancy implicit in the model relations and to monitor the inconsistencies between the model and the measured data. Other popular methods, such as those based on fault trees [4] , [10] or propagation digraphs [7] - [9] , [6] , rely on a more qualitative model of the plant. Finally, many knowledge-based approaches have been developed by resorting to Artificial Intelligence techniques [3] .
All these methods have their own advantages and specific fields of application, and could be profitably envisaged in a general fault detection approach coping with the following requirements.
Modularity and flexibility Any element of the process and of the diagnostic environment should be described by its own model, to be subsequently used in an automatic design of the composite model of the overall system. The availability of a library of elementary models would be helpful for a rapid prototyping of the diagnostic algorithm. In turn, modularity implies flexibility, that is the possibility to quickly analyze and modify the diagnostic strategy. Hierarchical design It should be possible to design the diagnostic strategy at different levels of abstraction and following a top-down approach. This allows one to assign to different teams some specific diagnostic tasks and to assemble the developed solutions verifying the congruence of the overall system afterwards. Data fusion The diagnostic system must be able to extract information from many different sources: local signal analysis, hardware redundancy, analytical redundancy, intelligent instrumentation, empirical knowledge, logical conditions. [13] , to specify the adopted diagnostic procedures. For any method to be extensively applied in the industrial world, an important condition is its compatibility with FMEA.
Temporal analysis
Integration of the control and diagnostic environments Usually, after the detection of a fault, the control system is reconfigured. Then, the formalism used in the control design phase must be compatible with that adopted in the definition of the diagnostic system and the same software environments must be used for the development of both the control and the fault detection algorithms. In this paper, a new method coping with the above requirements, and in particular with the need to combine the different approaches presently available, is presented for the development of a diagnostic system for complex industrial plants. The technique here proposed consists of describing all the elements of the plant and the diagnostic system (plant devices, sensors, actuators, diagnostic tests, hardware and analytical redundancies) in terms of Discrete-Event Systems (DES). Then, a formal composition rule of these elementary modules is given and an inference procedure for the identification and isolation of faults is discussed. Temporal information is also considered to speed up the fault isolation procedure and, in some cases, to isolate faults with the same static fault signature. The use of DES in fault detection has already been proposed in the literature, see for example [17] where the diagnosis is performed by a suitable observer for DES and [16] where that method is applied to telecommunication networks. With respect to the approach proposed in [17] , emphasis is given here on the aspects of "data fusion," temporal analysis and compatibility with industrial standards.
The technique here proposed has already been used in an industrial automotive application to study a diagnostic strategy for the isolation of the faults of the throttle body, the intake manifold, the accelerator and brake pedals, the combustion chamber and of a number of sensors. On the whole, a diagnostic strategy with 20 tests has been analyzed for the isolation of 21 faults [15] ; the achieved results are totally in agreement with those provided by a standard FMEA analysis, which however required much more effort for its development. A related problem of reduced size is discussed in the paper to highlight the potentialities of the this approach.
II. DISCRETE-EVENT MODELING OF THE DIAGNOSTIC SYSTEM
A diagnostic system can be viewed as composed by apparatuses A and diagnostic tests T . The apparatuses can be physical devices (plant elements, sensors, actuators, etc.), but also immaterial elements composing the overall plant and automation system, such as software code. The diagnostic tests T can be signal comparisons, consistency relations, analytical redundancies, logical propositions.
Both apparatuses A and tests where the states X = fx 1 ; 11 1; x n g describe the normal or the failed behavior of the components; the outputs Y = fy1; 111 ; ypg are the available alarms; the events 6 = fe 1 ; 111; e m g represent the occurrence of faults and govern the transition between states. Moreover f : X 26 ! X is the transition function (xj = f (xi; e k )), h: X ! Y is the output transformation (y j = h(x i )), x is the initial state.
Example 1: A sensor is an apparatus A subject to electrical faults efs and functional faults f fs . When an electrical fault occurs, the measured signal is permanently out of range and an electrical test can detect its status setting to one an output alarm y s ; while a functional fault (a bias or a long term drift) is not detected by the measure itself, but its identification and isolation calls for other diagnostic tests. The corresponding FSM has three states, Safe (S s ), Electrical Fault (EF s ), Functional Fault (F Fs ), and three fault events, occurrence of an electrical fault ef s , of a functional fault f f s and absence of faults, or safe conditions s = ef s^f f s . The sensor model, reported in Fig. 1 The faults can occur only one at a time and, once a fault has occurred, the diagnostic procedure is completed before the arrival of a new fault event.
Technically, this assumption is useful to limit the dimension of the FSM generated by the composition of elementary FSM models, although the procedure described below can be extended to relax this hypothesis. A modified composition rule allowing for the simultaneous presence of two faults is reported in [11] . Moreover, once a fault has been detected, the system is usually reconfigured to maintain safety standards. In the new system configuration, any further fault has to be viewed as a non simultaneous fault occurring to a safe configuration. For this reason, in many fields, such as in automotive applications, Assumption 1 is largely accepted. After the composition of FSM models, it can happen that some states of the resulting model are unreachable by any event. These states must be eliminated before proceeding further in the composition.
In is equivalent to the so-called matrix of residuals R, whose ith column is associated with an event ei and represents the configuration of the alarms due to the occurrence of e i , i.e. it is the fault signature. It is then apparent that a necessary and sufficient condition for the fault e i to be uniquely identified by the inspection of the configuration of alarms in static conditions is that all the columns of R are different. Given R, the problem of evaluating the minimum number of alarms necessary to uniquely identify a given subset of faults has been treated and solved in [11] .
Example 2: An important problem in drive-by-wire systems of car engines is the diagnosis of the throttle and of the intake manifold. Typically, two sensors are used to measure the throttle angle position according to a hardware redundancy approach. Assuming for simplicity that all the other elements of the system (pressure sensor, injectors, …) properly work, there are four apparatuses (throttle, throttle position sensors, intake manifold) subject to seven different faults: block (fth) and leakage (f thl ) of the throttle, electrical and functional faults of the two sensors (ef s1 , f f s1 , ef s2 , f f s2 ), and leakage of the intake manifold (fim), due for example to a hole. The model of the sensors has been shown in Example 1, while the throttle and the intake manifold do not have any output and are fully described by the matrices and is sensitive to f thl , fim , efsi , f fsi ; i = 1; 2. Both of them are described by matrices ES ari and O ar with the a structure analogous to that of ES hr and O hr (see [15] ). By combining all these elementary models according to the procedure previously described, one finally obtains the matrix of residuals as shown at the bottom of the next page. The analysis of R shows that the faults f thl and fim are not distinguishable, so that some more tests should be added. Moreover, it is easy to verify that some tests could be eliminated (for example the analytical redundancy test with output y ref ) without modifying the isolation properties of the scheme in static conditions. Finally, note that the obtained model can be viewed at an higher level of abstraction as a single FSM, to be assembled to other FSM provided by different working teams.
III. TEMPORAL ANALYSIS
The dynamics of the plant and of the diagnostic tests, due for example to the filtering actions used to reduce the effects of outliers and to limit false alarms, causes a delay between the occurrence of fault events and the switching of the alarms. These delays should be associated with all the transition functions and all the output transformations of the composite model. In general, a precise and unique knowledge of all these times is not available, while it is possible to give a reliable estimate of their lower and upper limits, see [8] , [12] . Moreover, in most cases one is usually interested in identifying and isolating a fault starting from safe conditions. Therefore, in order to account for the dynamics of the diagnostic procedure, it is often sufficient to specify two matrices T m and T M , which have the same dimensions and the same zero/nonzero pattern of the matrix R and whose nonzero elements t m (i; j) and t M (i; j) are the minimum and maximum times between the occurrence of the (fault) event j and its detection by the alarm i.
A. Diagnostic Algorithm
Assume that the diagnostic system with m outputs (alarms) and n+1 events (n faults and a "safe" event) is specified by the matrix of residuals R and by the minimum and maximum delay matrices T m and T M .
For any output yi, i = 1; 1 11; m, define the antecedent set A(yi) as the set ff l ; 11 1; f p g of faults detected by y i ; A(y i ) is defined by the elements equal to one in the ith row of R. For any fault fj , define the reachability set 0(f j ) as the set fy l ; 111 ; y p g of output alarms which detect the fault f j ; 0(f j ) is defined by the elements equal to one in the jth column of R. Let: Step 1) If, at a given time instant t, a subset H = fh1; 111 ; hrg = fy l ; 111 ; y p g of the outputs contemporaneously detects the presence of a fault, set t 0 = t and C = \i=1;111;rA(hi)
The set C contains all the faults which can be detected by the alarms in H.
Step 2) Set = fg; then, for any fj 2 C if 9 y k = 2 H and y i 2 H such that t M (k; j) < t m (i; j), include f j in .
Then update the set of candidate faults as follows:
This step excludes from the candidates all those faults which would force a switch of alarms not included into H before time t0.
Step 3) For any y i 2 H, consider the ith row of T m , select the elements corresponding to the columns associated with the faults fj 2 C and determine the minimum time t Step 4) Set = fg; then for any y i 2 H if 9f j 2 C such that Step 6) If the cardinality of C is equal to one, the procedure is completed and the fault is identified. As already discussed at Step 5, the algorithm is guaranteed to converge, in the sense that it terminates in finite time and uniquely identifies the fault provided that all the fault signatures are different. When two faults f i and f j have the same signature, by a-priori analyzing the matrices T m and T M , one can verify if fi and fj are guaranteed to be distinguishable.
Proposition 1:
Given f i and f j such that 0(f i ) = 0(f j ), if there are two alarms y h and y k such that the following condition holds
then the algorithm uniquely identifies the fault. Proof: Condition 1 states that if fi occurs, then the sequence of switches is fy h ; y k g, while the switching due to f j is fy k ; y h g. The analysis at
Step 6 allows to discriminate between the two cases. Example 3: Consider a diagnostic system, with six alarms, six possible faults (plus the "safe" event f 1 ), and specified by the matrices, as shown at the bottom of the page, where the elements not defined correspond to null values in the associated matrix of residuals.
Suppose that the fault f 6 occurs at t = 0 and that the alarms switch on in the following order: y 2 , y 1 ; y 6 6 ; f 7 g; 8 = fy 3 ; y 5 g; 8 = 8 \ 0(C) = fg 6) 9 = fy 2 ; y 1 ; y 6 g; finally it is possible to remove f 7 because t m (1; 7) > t M (6; 7) so that C = ff6g and at time t = 55+t0, the fault is uniquely detected. Note that the possibility to uniquely isolate f6 and f7 is a-priori guaranteed in view of the previous Proposition by inspecting their minimum and maximum propagation times toward y1 and y6. For the same reason, an a-priori analysis of T m and T M allows one to conclude that f 3 , f 4 and f 5 can be isolated even if they have the same static signature.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In view of its characteristics, which fully comply with the requirements listed in the Introduction, the method here proposed is currently used in industry for automotive applications. A wide library of reusable models has been developed and the possibility to follow a top-down design approach has been exploited. It has also to be remarked that the integration of the proposed method with the control system specification, design and simulation is natural in the context of hybrid systems, where the plant is described by a continuous time model, while the occurrence of faults is represented by asynchronous events modifying the system structure. Then, it is also fully compatible with the international standard IEC1499, [18] .
